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NOTE
NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS: AN EQUAL
PROTECTION PERSPECTIVE
Municipalities and other state governmental subdivisions
commonly have notice of claim provisions embodied in their ordinances, statutes, or enabling legislation.' Although these provisions
may vary in their specific schemes,2 they generally require, as a
condition precedent to the initiation of a lawsuit against a governmental entity, that notice of all tort claims be delivered to a
designated public official. 3 Since the time periods within which
such notice must be filed are usually quite short,4 these provisions

I

See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.151-.152 (3d ed. F.
Ellard 1963; cum. supp. J. Latta & D. Parnell 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN]. No
attempt is made here to list the many widely varying notice of claim provisions in all
jurisdictions. Some states have a more or less unified system of notice of claim provisions.
For example, in New York notice of claim requirements for claims against counties, towns,
cities, villages, school districts, and other municipal corporations are governed entirely by
N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1965). See Liff & Humburg, Section 50-e, General
Munidpal Law Re-examined, 45 N.Y.B.J. 401 (1973). But in Texas each city of more than
5,000 inhabitants has the right, under "home rule" legislation, to promulgate its own notice
requirements. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1165, 1175(6) (1963); see, e.g., Brantley v. City
of Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); J.
ANDRUS, MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN TEXAS 26-46 (1962).

2 Although there is considerable variation among provisions, the following are seven
standard features of most notice provisions. The notice must: (1) be in writing; (2) be given
to a named official; (3) be given within a specified time from the date of the occurrence
giving rise to the claim; (4) state the place of the occurrence; (5) state the time of occurrence;
(6) state the circumstances surrounding the occurrence; (7) state an intention to seek
recovery. MCQUILLIN § 53.152. These basic requirements are subject to legislative and
judicial modifications and exceptions. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text infra.
3 3 E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 448(a) (1958). See, e.g., Clark v. City of
Comptori, 22 Cal. App. 3d 522, 99 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1971); Fox v. City of Overland Park, 210
Kan. 16, 499 P.2d 524 (1972); Barchet v. New York City Transit Authority, 20 N.Y.2d 1,
228 N.E.2d 361, 281 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1967); Short v. City of Greensboro, 15 N.C. App. 135,
189 S.E.2d 560 (1972); Dias v. San Antonio, 488 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
4 See generally MCQUILLIN § 53.161. The time periods usually commence from the date
of the occurrence giving rise to the claim. The periods vary greatly, but they are almost
always shorter than the periods imposed by the pertinent statutes of limitations. In California, for example, notice of tort claims against local public entities must be filed within 100
days (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 911.2 (West 1966)), and the applicable period of limitations is
either two years or six months (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 945.6 (West Supp. 1974)); in Illinois local
public entities must be given notice within one year, and the applicable period of limitations
is two years (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-101, -102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974)); in Iowa cities
under special charter must be notified within 30 days and the pertinent statute of limitations
is three months (IOWA CODE ANN. § 420.45 (1949)) (under IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (Supp.
1974), two year statute of limitations for ordinary tort claims); in Minnesota municipalities
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frequently operate much like abbreviated statutes of limitations for
5
plaintiffs injured by governmental tort-feasors.
General dissatisfaction with notice of claim provisions has been
voiced from all quarters. 6 One of the most glaring inequities
engendered by these provisions is a favoring of governmental over
private tort-feasors, in that governmental tort-feasors are exposed
to suit for a considerably shorter period of time. 7 In 1972 the8
Supreme Court of Michigan, in Reich v. State Highway Department,
held a state notice of claim statute unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds,9 and in 1973 the Supreme Court of Nevada
followed suit in Turner v. Staggs' ° when it invalidated a county
notice of claim statute for identical reasons." These decisions
represent the first time that such provisions have been successfully
challenged on broad constitutional grounds.' 2 Together, Reich and
must be notified within 30 days (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.05 (1963)), and the applicable
period of limitations is either two or six years (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 541.05 and 541.07
(Supp. 1974)); New York prescribes a 90-day notice period for claims against municipal
corporations (N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 50-e(1) (McKinney 1965)), and the applicable period
of limitations is one year and ninety days (N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 50-i (McKinney 1965)
(under N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1972), and N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967) two or three year statute of limitations for ordinary tort claims); in
Texas each city establishes its own notice periods, which are often as short as 30 days (see,
e.g., note 1 supra; Barrett v. City of Dallas, 490 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)), and the
applicable period of limitations is two years (TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958)).
' See MCQUILLIN § 53.154. There are numerous cases supporting this proposition. See,
e.g., City of Barnesville v. Powell, 124 Ga. App. 132, 183 S.E.2d 55 (1971); Salavea v.
Honolulu, 517 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1973); Brandner v. City of Aberdeen, 78 S.D. 574, 105 N.W.2d
665 (1960). The court in Salavea opined that because the notice of claim provision was in fact
a statute of limitations, it thereby was in conflict with the statute of limitations enacted by the
Hawaii legislature. According to the Supreme Court of Hawaii, "[allthough some may
denominate such statutory provisions a condition precedent to liability, ... the notice of
claim requirement operates, in reality, as a statute of limitations." 517 P.2d at 53 (citations
omitted).
' See, e.g., Salavea v. Honolulu, 517 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1973); Lorton v. Brown County
Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966); Liff &
Humburg, supra note 1; Note, Torts--GovernmentalImmunity-Special ProceduralRequirements
Unconstitutiona 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 236 (1967); Note, Delay in Notice of Tort Claim Against a
Governmental Agency, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 23 (1971).

7 See, e.g., McCann v. City of Lake Wales, 144 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1962); King v. Johnson,
47 Ill. 2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973);
Zipser v. Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494 (White Plains City Court 1972), rev'd, 75
Misc. 2d 489, 348 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See also note 69 and accompanying text infra.
8 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
9 See notes 80-87 and accompanying text infra.
10 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1974).
11 See note 88-91 and accompanying text infra.
12 There have been a plethora of constitutional attacks upon notice of claim provisions.
Until Turner and Reich, challenges asserting general unconstitutionality were wholly unsuccessful, although challenges based upon specific grounds (notably infancy and other disabilities) had occasionally been upheld. See notes 53-57, 68-79 and accompanying text infra.
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Turner may herald a judicial reassessment in this area; at the very
least, they indicate that a new and hard examination should be
given to the constitutionality of notice of claim provisions in today's
legal climate.

BACKGROUND

A.

Sovereign Immunity

The origins and underlying purposes of notice of claim provisions are rooted in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This
doctrine, embodying the notion that the government should be
free from tort liability, was transposed from the English common
law into the American judicial system.' 3 Although the doctrine has
been fully embraced by national and state governments, 14 state
subdivisions and local governmental units have not as uniformly
5
acquired the immunity principle.'
Immunity from tort liability at the level of municipalities and
The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the federal
government in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 971-94 (4th ed. 1971). Similarly, the state courts adopted this doctrine to
preclude claims against the state and its subordinate governmental entities. Two early
examples are Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 247 (1812), and Black v.
Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792). In 1793 the Supreme Court dedared that it had
jurisdiction in suits against states by private citizens of other states. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The eleventh amendment quickly took away this jurisdiction. See
Note, Private Suits Against States in Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 331 (1966).
There are two classic justifications for this doctrine in the United States. The first has no
logical basis, but rather is simply a carry-over from the English common-law precept that
"the King can do no wrong." See Morgan v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 531 (1871);
Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 349 (1925). The second, more reasoned
justification was articulated by Justice Holmes:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). A definitive treatment of the origins
and development of this doctrine is found in Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI,
36 YALE L.J. I (1926).
14 In addition, the acceptance of immunity by state governments often meant an
automatic extension of immunity to state agencies. See Note, The Applicability of Sovereign
Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1961). For example, a
highway department, or even a town or county, might be considered simply a branch of the
state government, and thus enjoy the immunity of that state. See, e.g., Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Murphy v. Ives, 150 Conn. 723, 196 A.2d 596 (1963); Albany
County v. Hooker, 204 N.Y. 1, 97 N.E. 403 (1912); James & Yost, Inc. v. State Bd. of Higher
Educ., 216 Ore. 598, 340 P.2d 577 (1959).
" See generally Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, I-Ill, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924).
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other state governmental subdivisions has been achieved in at least
four ways. First, courts have characterized some governmental
units as being extensions or agencies of the state, and thereby have
entitled them to share the state's immunity. 16 Second, American
courts have often relied on the rationale announced in the eigh-7
teenth century English precedent, Russell v. The Men of Devon,1
that "quasi corporations, created by the legislature for purposes of
public policy, . . . are not liable to an action for ...neglect, unless
the action be given by some statute."' 8 Under this view, certain
local units, usually counties and towns, possess their own inherent
immunity, just as federal and state governments do.' 9 Third, some
municipal corporations, such as cities and villages, have received a
kind of half measure of immunity which protects them from tort
liability only to the extent that such liability arises from a "governmental" as opposed to a "proprietary" function.2 0 Although
difficult to define and distinguish, this dichotomy has been created
to immunize municipal corporations only where they are acting as
a state agency or in a general governmental, as opposed to a
private, capacity. 2 I Finally, these governmental units, particularly
16

See note 14 supra.

'7

2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).

18 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 247, 250 (1812).
'9 See, e.g., Western Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank v. Ross, 345 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1965);
Carter v. Wilds, 8 Houst. 14, 31 A. 715 (Del. Super. 1887); DeKalb County v. Deason, 112
Ga. App. 721, 146 S.E.2d 382 (1965); City of Grenada v. Grenada County, 115 Miss. 831, 76
So. 682 (1917). See also Weyrauch, The Taxpayer's Stake in Municipal Tort Liability, 42 NIMLO
MUNICIPAL L. REv. 379 (December 1953).

20 See, e.g., Day v. City of Berlin, 157 F.2d 323 (1st Cir. 1946); McCann v. State Dep't of
Mental Health, 47 Mich. App. 326, 209 N.W.2d 456 (1973); Heitman v. Lake City, 225
Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947); Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 391, 213 P. 938
(1923). See generally MCQUILLIN §§ 53.23-.24.
Originally, municipal corporations were treated as equivalent to private corporations
and therefore enjoyed no tort immunity whatsoever. It would appear that the
governmental-proprietary distinction is purely an American judicial invention, probably first
expounded in Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842). The
development of this test of municipal tort liability is discussed fully in Barnett, The
Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937).
21 For an excellent treatment of this dichotomy see E. YOKLEY, supra note 3, § 446. The
purpose of the distinction is to hold a municipal corporation liable when it acts in some sort
of private capacity, much like any private corporation. But when the municipality is deemed
to have acted in a public way, promoting in some way the public welfare, it will be deemed
immune. As expressed in Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass, 387, 390, 114 N.E. 722, 724
(1917), "[tlhe underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the
element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit." This test is easier to state than to
employ; predictably, the courts have had great difficulty in its application, and the resulting
decisions have lacked consistency. See, e.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923);
Kamau v. Hawaii County, 41 Haw. 527 (1957); Parker v. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148,
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municipal corporations, have also achieved immunity through express statutory or constitutional provisions. 22
In these ways local governmental units have achieved a large
degree of tort immunity. In the twentieth century, however, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been severely criticized. 23 Since
sovereign immunity eliminates suits against the state for torts,
which, if committed by private parties, would probably be actionable, it has been characterized as both unjust and incompatible with
the American governmental-legal system. 24 This characterization is
bolstered by three important facts. First, the United States is not
governed by a monarch (who the English have said can do no
wrong). 25 Second, the American sovereign power belongs not to
the government, but to the people. Third, and most important
from a legal standpoint, some jurisdictions have openly acknowledged that private citizens have a fundamental right to seek
redress in tort from whomever inflicts a wrong, including the
26

state.

Gradually, the legislatures and courts have responded to these
criticisms so that today there exists a partial or total abrogation of
the doctrine in a number of jurisdictions. 27 But even where this
410 P.2d 347 (1966); City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 (1941). This
murky distinction has heen much criticized. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 15; Fuller &
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941).
22 The common law in this area has undergone considerable change in recent years due
to the promulgation of statutory and constitutional provisions. See W. PROSSER, supra note
13, at 983-84. See also notes 27-31 and accompanying text infra.
21 See, e.g., Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945);
Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51
N.W.2d 30 (1952); W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 984; Fuller & Casner, supra note 21;
Greenhill & Murto, GovernmentalImmunity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 462 (1971); Stason, Governmental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1321 (1954); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, (1961), modfied sub nom. Corning Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d
325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 592, 240 N.E.2d 860, 867, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 907 (1968) (dissenting opinion): Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the
Emperor Has No Clothes, 1966 U. ILL. L. FORUM 828; note 23 supra.
25 See Barry, supra note 13, at 349-58.
26 Wendler v. Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 759, 316 P.2d 265, 279 (1957).
27 See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968) (abolition of municipal governmental
immunity; reinstated by Arkansas legislature in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971));
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 968 (1960); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962); Willis v. Dep't of Conservation, 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
The following are examples of statutes which waive, in varying degrees, state tort
immunity: ALASKA STAT § 09.65.070 (Supp. 1972); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 900-905.8 (West
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piecemeal approach has succeeded in abrogating or substantially
limiting the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it has failed to curtail
or eliminate some of the doctrine's most troublesome vestiges,
among them notice of claim provisions.2 8 In fact, statutory notice
of claim provisions have been viewed as at least a partial substitute
for sovereign immunity.2 9 Although they have sprung from a
doctrine of dubious legal and social value, 30 it is clear that notice of
claim provisions have become a universal mainstay in the structure
of state and local government. 3 1
B.

TraditionalJustifications and Purposes

Over the years a plethora of rationales have been offered to
justify the need for notice of claim provisions. An examination of
the case law reveals that nearly all the stated purposes and objectives of these provisions fit within four general categories.
1966); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 8-101 to -103 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.031-.038
(1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.43 (1966).
As the dates of the cases and statutes cited above indicate, the trend toward true
abrogation is a recent one. In limited and well defined ways, however, states and their
subdivisions have permitted tort suits for many years. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 975-76.
Thus, today "[ifn all of the states .... consent [to be sued] has been given, to a greater or
lesser extent." Id. at 975.
28 See MCQUILLIN § 53.03. Since the state and local governments have, by statute,
charter or judicial fiat, allowed suit against themselves and their subdivisions, they can
therefore be sued only on their own terms. One commentator has summarized some of the
limitations frequently imposed:
In the states which have waived sovereign immunity, the judicially and legislatively
created exceptions to government tort liability are of five types: (1) preservation of
immunity for torts arising out of "governmental activities"; (2) preservation of
immunity for governmental functions for which by statute orjudicial interpretation
there is no duty of proper performance running from government to individuals;
(3) preservation of immunity for claims based upon discretionary or high-level
decisions of government officials; (4) preservation of immunity for specifically
named classifications of torts or activities; and (5) limitations on the governmental
units and employees subject to liability and on the time, procedure, and amounts
recoverable.
Henke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law From a National Perspective, 48 ORE. L. REv.
95, 101 (1968) (emphasis added). See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
29 As one writer has stated, upon the abrogation of sovereign immunity as a means of
protection against tort liability,
[o]ther techniques were devised to bring about similar results. Some communities, and some entire states, for example, were protected by laws which set
ceilings on the amounts recoverable by tort claimants. More widely adopted was a
requirement that, as a condition precedent to suit after injury is suffered, the
plaintiff must file with the municipality a notice of his claim for damages. Some
municipalities demanded highly technical conformity with their local laws, setting
precise forms, precise times and precise manners of compliance, for breach of
which action was barred.
Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
30 See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
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. First, by far the most common justification is that notice of
claim provisions enable the governmental unit to investigate
promptly the incident giving rise to the claim, thereby facilitating
an immediate assessment of potential liability.3 2 The obvious
reasoning is that fraudulent and meritless claims are more difficult
to detect where considerable time is allowed to elapse and render
the facts surrounding the incident stale and less readily
ascertainable. 3 3 The second justifying rationale, closely akin to the
first, encompasses the viewpoint that notice of claim provisions
protect against the cost of needless litigation by increasing the
likelihood of early adjustment of disputes and out-of-court
settlements.3 4 Although most courts have relied heavily upon these
two stock explanations, others espouse a third rationale, explaining
that early notice of accidents serves to prevent future accidents
(and of course concomitant additional expense) by enabling the
governmental unit to make any- necessary repairs or remedies as
quickly as possible. 35 Finally, a few cases have suggested that
advance notice of possible liability aids public entities in determining their future taxes and in planning their fiscal budgets. 6 In
general, the emphasis in all of these categories appears to be on the
protection of the public coffers, and the avoidance of additional
expense, with perhaps an ancillary concern for public safety.
C. Legislative and Judicial Treatment
A series of problems is generated by the general tendency of
notice of claim provisions to be replete with technical require32 Yokley views the investigative purpose as the sole object of these provisions. 3 E.
YOKLEY, supra note 3, at § 448(b). See, e.g., Lutsch v. Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 156, 159, 47
N.E.2d 545, 546 (1943); Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 503, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 631, 370 P.2d 334, 335 (1962); Zack v. Borough of Saxonburg, 386 Pa. 463, 470,
126 A.2d 753, 756 (1956); Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 129 S.E.2d 31 (1963);
Brigham v. Seattle, 34 Wash. 2d 786, 210 P.2d 144 (1949).
3 The New York State Judicial Council stated:
The requirement of notice is one of the safeguards devised by the law to
protect municipalities against fraudulent and stale claims for injuries to person and
property. It is designed to afford the municipality opportunity to make an early
investigation of the claim while the facts surrounding the alleged claim are still
"fresh."
NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 265 (1944).
" See, e.g., City of Anniston v. Rosser, 275 Ala. 659, 158 So. 2d 99 (1963); Taylor
v. King, 104 Ga. App. 589, 122 S.E.2d 265 (1961); Aaron v. City of Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 32
N.E.2d 88 (1941).
" See, e.g., Cornett v. City of Neodesha, 187 Kan. 60, 353 P.2d 975 (1960); Gallegos v.
Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972).
3'6 See, e.g., King v. Johnson, 47 Ill. 2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970); Lunday v.
Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Iowa 1973).
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ments and to afford the claimant a relatively brief period within
which to comply. 37 Most striking is the obvious potential created
for plaintiffs to be precluded harshly and unfairly from prosecuting their claims; and this potential is all too often realized. 38 For
example, the Supreme Court of Georgia once dismissed a litigant's
suit for failure to comply with the City of Calhoun's notice of claim
provision where it was conceded that the city had actual knowledge
of the claim within the prescribed six month filing period. 39 The
plaintiff had orally notified the city clerk a few days after her
automobile was forced off the road due to defective highway
conditions. 40 The city clerk and mayor inspected the site, and
within three weeks of the accident the plaintiff, who had been
permanently injured, appeared before the city council and orally
presented her claim. The city council twice informed the plaintiff
that her claim would be acted upon as soon as her doctor sent her a
medical statement. The plaintiff presented the actual written notice
of claim approximately seven months after her accident, and
eventually the trial court dismissed her suit. In a terse decision, the
Georgia Supreme Court stated that the Calhoun city council had
no right to waive the six month period established by the Georgia
legislature, and that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice
of claim provision, albeit a minor and technical shortcoming,
nevertheless required affirmance of the trial court's dismissal.
Not surprisingly, many legislatures and courts have acted to
alleviate these injustices. Numerous states have written clauses into
their notice of claim statutes excusing failure of strict compliance
for certain reasons therein enumerated. 4 1 Although it has been
criticized for not being liberal enough, 42 section 50-e of the New
37 See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.

31 There are numerous cases reflecting harsh results due to enforced strict compliance
with notice provisions. See, e.g., Allbritton v. Birmingham, 274 Ala. 550, 150 So. 2d 717
(1963); Goodwin v. City of Bloomfield, 203 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 1973); Workman v. City of
Emporia, 200 Kan. 112, 434 P.2d 846 (1967); Stowe v. City of Elmira, 31 N.Y.2d 814, 291
N.E.2d 586, 339 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1972); Santiago v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 41
App. Div. 2d 616, 340 N.Y.S.2d 491 (lst Dep't 1973); Brantley v. City of Dallas, 498 S.W.2d
452 (rex. Civ. App. 1973). See also note 6 and accompanying text supra.
39 City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 S.E.2d 752 (1966).
40 The facts of this case are set forth in the opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals.
Holland v. City of Calhoun, 114 Ga. App. 51, 150 S.E.2d 155, rev'd, 222 Ga. 817, 152 S.E.2d
752 (1966).
41 See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 466.05 (1963) (claims against municipalities not barred

for failure to demand compensation or other relief); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5301 (1972)
(court may allow reasonable excuses for failure to comply); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.43 (1966)
(action not barred if plaintiff can show municipality had actual notice and not prejudiced).
42 See Liff & Humburg, supra note 1; Note, Renewed Recommendations for Revisions of
Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 318 (1950).
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York .General Municipal Law4 3 is a good example. This section
permits the court, in its discretion, to excuse delays in filing notice
against municipalities due to infancy, incapacity, death of the
claimant during the filing period, and justified reliance upon the
settlement representations of an authorized representative. 44 It
also permits the court to allow good faith mistakes in notices of
45
claim to be corrected at any time through the trial.
Similarly, the courts in a large number ofjurisdictions have cut
broader and more extensive in-roads toward mollifying the harshness of notice provisions. Frequently, as in New York, this has been
accomplished through the exercise of the discretion which the state
legislatures have given the courts in this area.4 6 Although court
47
action in this respect has been varied and seemingly inconsistent,
most of the judicial approaches may be categorized into one or
more of three general classifications: (1) infancy and other incapacity; (2) substantial compliance; and (3) waiver and estoppel.
1. Infancy and Other Incapacity
Many jurisdictions have recognized that it is excusable to fail to
comply with notice of claim provisions due to infancy and/or
physical or mental incapacity. 4 8 Most courts so holding have relied
43 N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1965).
44 Id. § 50-e(5).
45 Id. § 50-e(6).
46 See Notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra; notes 51, 52 and accompanying text
infra.
47 For example, compare the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in City of Calhoun v.
Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 S.E.2d 752 (1966) (see notes 39-40 and accompanying textsupra),
with the opinion of that same court six years earlier in Aldred v. City of Summerville, 215
Ga. 651, 113 S.E.2d 108 (1960). In Aldred claimant was injured as a result of defective
highway conditions. The Georgia court found sufficient compliance where plaintiff's notice
failed to describe the precise negligence which caused the accident, and instead stated: "1 am
sure the Mayor-and Council are familiar with the facts ...consequently, I will not try to go
into further deatil." 215 Ga. at 652, 113 S.E.2d at 109. Compare Olivier v. St. Petersburg, 65
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1953), with Magee v. City of Jacksonville, 87 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1956). In Olivier
notification of the time and date as well as brief facts of the accident was held to be
insufficient compliance with the notice provision. In Magee a similar notice requirement was
satisfied by a notice which stated the time and date, brief facts, and the approximate place of
the accident. The court in Magee distinguished Olivier on the tenuous ground that in the
latter case "[tihe street itself was never mentioned." 87 So. 2d at 592.
48 For illustrative cases establishing infancy as an excuse for noncompliance, see
McDonald v. Spring Valley, 285 Ill.
52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918); Lazich v. Belanger, 111 Mont.
48, 105 P.2d 738 (1940); Murphy v. Ft. Edward, 213 N.Y. 397, 107 N.E. 716 (1915);
Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N.C. 321, 22 S.E.2d 900 (1942); Simpson v. City of Abilene, 388
S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
For illustrative cases establishing mental or physical disability as an excuse for noncompliance, see Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938); Forsyth v.
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upon the theory that it is essentially unjust and inequitable for the
law to set requirements with which it is impossible to comply.
According to one court,
[I]t would be basically unfair to deprive [the claimant] of recourse to the courts if the injuries suffered prevented him from
complying with the notice requirements.... To permit such a
situation to occur would make it possible for the city to take
advantage of and benefit from its own wrong. This would not be
consistent with 49our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice.

However, there are a great number of jurisdictions which
refuse to excuse strict compliance on such grounds. 50 Furthermore, in those jurisdictions which do permit some degree of
noncompliance on grounds of incapacity, it is usually a question of
fact whether the excuse of infancy or other disability is valid in that
particular case. 5 1 This highly fact-oriented approach is devoid of
predictability and is susceptible to inconsistent and acrimonious
52
results.
It is therefore not surprising that the failure of many states to
excuse noncompliance due to infancy and other incapacity has
been challenged on constitutional grounds. The usual constitutional objection centers on the argument that it is violative of the
City of Oswego, 191 N.Y. 441, 84 N.E. 392 (1908); Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okla. 39, 191 P. 186
(1920); Born v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 719, 68 P. 386 (1902). For a cataloguing of cases on this
general topic, see MCQUILLIN § 53.158-.159.

19 Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34, 37 (Alas. 1965).
50 See, e.g., Fox v. Overland Park, 210 Kan. 16, 499 P.2d 524 (1972); Fry v. Willamalane
Park & Recreation Dist., 4 Or. App. 575, 481 P.2d 648 (1971); Waite v. Orgill, 203 Tenn.
146, 310 S.W.2d 179 (1958); Daniel v. Richmond, 199 Va. 490, 100 S.E.2d 763 (1957).
"' See, e.g., Williams v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 143 Cal. App. 2d 564, 299 P.2d
916 (1956); Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973); Blecker
v. City of New York, 24 App. Div. 2d 714, 263 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dep't 1965).
52 For example, in Fornaro v. Town of Clarkstown, 44 App. Div. 2d 596, 597, 353
N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (2d Dep't 1974), the court stated: "A 13-year old child cannot reasonably
be required to press his claim when his attorney fails to do so." Yet in Santiago v. Board of
Educ. of City of New York, 41 App. Div. 2d 616, 340 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1973), the
court held insufficient a ten year old infant's notice of claim which had been filed five days
late.
Such inconsistencies could be ameliorated by the enactment of specific legislative
guidelines. Vague terms such as "incapacity" could be given concrete meaning in statutes.
Such guidelines have been developed by many states which have general provisions extending their statutes of limitations for plaintiffs suffering from a disability and similar standards
should be applied in the notice of claim context. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 5-230, -235 (1948)
(normal period of limitations commences after disability--e.g., infancy or insanity-ends);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 5-201 (1974) (normal period of'limitations commences
after gaining capacity, e.g., attaining age 18); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 94, 96 (1960)
(plaintiff has either one or two years to sue after disability ends).
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to bar claimants
from bringing suit because of their incapacity. 53 In one case, for
example, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended "that imposing
such a requirement upon a minor does not comport with . .. ideas
of fair play and therefore violates due process.

'54

In another case,

the court agreed with the claimant's argument that such provisions
deprived infants of a vested right-the right to seek redress in
tort-without due process of law.55 Other constitutional attacks
have been founded on equal protection grounds5 6 -_that disabled

persons are being denied equal protection because of inability to
assert their claims' In general it can be said that these constitutional
57
attacks have only occasionally been successful.
2. Substantial Compliance
More widely accepted than excuse-for-incapacity is the doctrine of substantial compliance. 58 Instead of demanding precise
and technical fulfillment of the requirements of a given notice
provision, courts usually require only that the notice "inform the...
officials with reasonable certainty of the time, place, cause and
nature of the accident and the general nature and extent of the
injuries. . . -59 Quite obviously if, within the specified time period,
a governmental unit receives informally all the information it would
" See, e.g., Goncalves v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 166 Cal. App. 2d 87, 332
P.2d 713 (1958) (minor's due process claim rejected); Touhey v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind.
98, 93 N.E. 540 (1911) (no violation of 14th amendment where claimant mentally and
physically unable to file notice); City of Waxahachie v. Harvey, 255 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953) (where plaintiff severely disabled, preclusion of'claim unreasonable and violative
of due process); Ocampo v. City of Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 137 N.W.2d 477 (1965) (minor
plaintiff's due process argument rejected).
"' Goncalves v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 166 Cal. App. 2d 87, 90, 332 P.2d
713, 715 (1958).
Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
s See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952)
(unsuccessful equal protection attack by minor); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27,
492 P.2d 1335 (1972) (rejection of infant's assertion that 30-day notice provision denied
equal protection); Cook v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 599, 521 P.2d 725 (1974) (successful equal
protection and due process attack by minor).
17 See notes 53, 56 and accompanying text supra.
11 McQuillin reports that "a substantial compliance with the statute, according to the
weight of authority, is all that is required." MCQUILLIN § 53.163 (emphasis added). M6st states
adhere to this doctrine, in one form or another. See, e.g., Galbreath v. Indianapolis, 253 Ind.
472, 255 N.E.2d 225 (1970); Travis v. Kansas City, 491 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1973); Zamel v.
Port of New York Authority, 56 N.J. 1, 264 A.2d 201 (1970); Sandak v. Tuxedo Union
School Dist., 308 N.Y. 226, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954); Heller v. Virginia Beach, 213 Va. 683,
194 S.E.2d 696 (1973); Higginbotham v. Charleston, 204 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1974).
" Aaron v. City of Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 230-31, 32 N.E.2d 88, 89 (1941).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:417

have acquired from the filing of aformal notice of claim, it has not
been prejudiced or harmed to any great degree.
This judicial construct differs from the incapacity notion in
one key respect. Substantial compliance pertains to the manner
and sufficiency of the notice filed with the governmental entity. On
the other hand, the excuse-for-incapacity doctrine relates to the
timeliness of filing the notice. But just as the courts differ widely as
to whether a delayed filing of notice was the result of an excusable
disability,6 0 they also vary in their judgments as to what constitutes
sufficient compliance in any given case. This kind of disagreement
is due, in part, to variations in the requirements of particular
notice provisions. For example, under the Georgia substantialcompliance doctrine it is not necessary that the plaintiff state any
amount of damages whatsoever. 61 A Texas court, however, held
that there was not substantial compliance with a city charter provision requiring a statement of the amount of damages sustained
when the claimant's notice stated only that she was willing to settle
her claim for $3,000.62 Such decisions provide little guidance for
future litigants, however, since they are generally limited to the
facts of the particular case and courts often fail to articulate
reasons why a certain course of conduct may or may not constitute
substantial compliance.6 3 Thus, unless the meaning of substantial
compliance is laid out, either by statute or by the courts, consistency and predictability under the doctrine will be difficult to
achieve.
3. Waiver and Estoppel
Occasionally, the courts have shown a willingness to find that a
public entity, through the actions or inactions of its agents and
employees, has waived, or should be estopped from asserting, a
defense based upon failure to give proper notice. 6 4 As with the
60 See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
61 Gainesville v. Moss, 108 Ga. App. 713, 134 S.E.2d 547 (1963); Maryon v. Atlanta, 149
Ga. 35, 99 S.E. 116 (1919).
62 Gardner v. Houston, 320 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). This decision, however,
is not indicative of the attitude of all Texas courts with regard to substantial compliance. See,
e.g., Ostrewich v. Houston, 419 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
63 There are numerous examples where the courts have simply given a summary or
pertinent quote from the notice of claim, and, without analysis, concluded that there either
has or has not been compliance with the applicable provision. See, e.g., City of Acworth v.
McLain, 99 Ga. App. 407, 108 S.E.2d 821 (1959); Brown v. City of South Bend, 148 Ind.
App. 436, 267 N.E.2d 400 (1971).
64 The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, finds "waiver or estoppel . . .when
there is an investigation followed by action in relation to the claimant that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that further notice is unnecessary ...." Rabinowitz v. Town
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excuse-for-disability construct, the waiver-estoppel rule pertains
more to the problem of delay in filing than to the sufficiency of
notice. The jurisdictions are currently divided on the question of
whether waiver and estoppel principles should be applied in this
context.6 5 But even among those jurisdictions which employ this
technique there is considerable variation as to the nature of the
factual pattern appropriate for a finding of a waiver or the imposition of an estoppel.6 6 In addition, courts will occasionally find that
there can be no waiver or estoppel where the person who waives or
whose actions would amount to estoppel does not have the proper
authority to do so.67 Such reasoning is not consonant with the
underlying objective of this principle, which is to protect citizens
where they have justifiably and reasonably relied upon official
behavior to their detriment.
II
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS

A. Judicial Response to the Constitutional Question
Notice of claim provisions have often been subject to constitutional challenge on due process grounds for their failure to take
of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1965). In Rabinowitz the court found this
waiver or estoppel where, after the Town had conducted an extensive investigation of the
accident, the Town's insurance investigator informed plaintiffs that the Town did not own
the property involved. Relying on this information, plaintiffs negotiated with the insurer's
attorney and did not learn that the Town actually did own the property until the time for
filing had passed.
1s Courts in the following cases have refused to employ waiver or estoppel: Schaefer v.
Mayor and Council of City of Athens, 120 Ga. App. 301, 170 S.E.2d 339 (1969); Frowner v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 25 I1. App. 2d 312, 167 N.E.2d 26 (1960); Forseth v. City of
Tacoma, 27 Wash. 2d 284, 178 P.2d 357 (1947).
Courts in the following cases, however, have readily employed waiver or estoppel:
Scibilia v. Niagara Falls, 44 App. Div. 2d 757, 354 N.Y.S.2d 229 (4th Dep't 1974); Roessing
v. City of Erie, 57 Pa. D. & C. 377, 29 Erie 152 (1945); Dias v. San Antonio, 488 S.W.2d 522
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
6 For example, although Florida adheres to the waiver-estoppel doctrine (see note 64
supra), in O'Conner v. Town of Pass-A-Grille Beach, 107 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958), representations by adjusters of a town's insurer that the insurer would make a fair
settlement with plaintiff, and that retaining an attorney would only retard the procedure,
created no estoppel or waiver. In Kern v. Central Free School Dist., 41 Misc. 2d 288, 245
N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1963), a New York court found waiver or estoppel under much the
same circumstances. There a school district's insurance carrier and the carrier's agent sent
letters to the claimant requesting her to forward her medical bills and advising her that
payments would be considered and made.
67 See, e.g., City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 S.E.2d 752 (1966); Rottschafer
v. East Grand Rapids, 342 Mich. 43, 69 N.W.2d 193 (1955).
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68
into account the infancy or other disability of the claimant.
Perhaps even more frequently there has been a second kind of
constitutional attack based upon the notion that notice provisions
operate to deny due process and equal protection to private tortfeasors and victims of governmental tort-feasors in that they expose private tort-feasors to a greater risk of liability than governmental tort-feasors, and render it more difficult for the victim of6a9
governmental tort to recover than the victim of a private tort.
However, whereas the more limited challenges dealing with disability have occasionally been successful, 70 these general constitutional
assaults had met with absolutely no acceptance until the recent
73
72
Turner71 and Reich decisions.
See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
There are dozens of cases in which the issue of the general unconstitutionality of
notice provisions has been raised. In MCQUILLIN § 53.152, an extensive list of cases treating
this question is catalogued. More recent cases include Gregory v. City of New York, 346 F.
App. 3d 897, 293
Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 9 Ill.
N.E.2d 440 (1973); Harris County v. Dowlearn, 489 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
One court formulated the argument this way: the notice of claim provision is
unfair in that it creates two separate and distinct classes of plaintiffs .... This is
not justice. In the United States there should not be any second-class plaintiffs just
as there should not be any second-class citizens ....This is a denial of due process
and equal protection ....
Zipser v. Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (White Plains City Ct. 1972), rev'd,
75 Misc. 2d 489, 348 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
As a practical matter, the argument that the victim of a governmental tort is denied due
process and equal protection is more important than such an argument by a private
tort-feasor since most constitutional claims arise where the victim of a governmental tort has
failed to meet the technical requirements of a notice provision. See, e.g., Housewright v. City
2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972); Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y.2d
of LaHarpe, 51 Ill.
484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952).
It should be noted that in a number of cases notice provisions have been attacked on
state constitutional grounds. For instance, in Parrish v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah,
•185 Ga. 828, 196 S.E. 721 (1938), a Georgia state notice of claim statute was challenged as
special legislation prohihited by the Georgia constitution. See Lorton v. Brown County
2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966); Peoples v. City of
Community Unit School Dist., 35 Ill.
Valparaiso, 178 lnd. 673, 100 N.E. 70 (1912).
70 See, e.g., McDonald v. Spring Valley, 285 Ill.
52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918); Grubaugh v.
City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970); Cook v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 599,
521 P.2d 725 (1974).
7' Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079
(1974). See notes 88-91 and accompanying text infra.
72 Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). See notes
80-87 and accompanying text infra.
73 See MCQUILLIN § 53.152.
In 1972 a New York trial court found § 50-e of the New York General Municipal Law
(see notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra) unconstitutional as violative of equal protection and due process. Zipser v. Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494 (White Plains City
Ct. 1972). The case was reversed with little comment. Zipser v. Pound, 75 Misc. 2d 489, 348
N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
88
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1. Traditional Reluctance to Invalidate Notice
Provisions
The question arises as to why courts have been so reluctant to
completely invalidate notice provisions on equal protection and
due process grounds. Although the reasons given are plentiful and
diverse, they can, in general, be separated into two types of
underlying rationales. Except for those decisions relying upon stare
decisis,7 4 the vast majority of these opinions are based upon either
sovereign immunity 75 or the finding of a rational basis for the
76
legislative classification.
The sovereign immunity argument is based on the premise
that since the state (or other governmental entity) has been properly and constitutionally endowed with complete sovereign immunity, the state legislature's decisions to allow the sovereign to be sued
in tort may be accompanied by any terms and qualifying provisos
which the legislature wishes to impose. One of those terms includes
early notice of all claims against the state or any of its subordinate
77
governmental entities.
Other courts have refrained from emphasizing the sovereign
immunity aspects of this issue and instead have taken the position
that the fourteenth amendment has not been violated so long as a
rational basis exists for the state's decision to prefer one class of
victims or tort-feasors over another. In so doing the courts have
amassed a plethora of reasons to support the finding of a rational
basis. Not surprisingly, most of these reasons parallel those usually
given as justifying the need for notice of claim provisions in
general: the special need for prompt investigation, the need to
achieve an early resolution of claims, the necessity of quickly
repairing injury-causing defects, and the importance of accounting
for potential liabilities in the tax and budget planning process. 78 A
74 See, e.g., Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 Ill.
2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).

75 See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952); Brantley v.
Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974) (distinguishing Reich for reasons premised on sovereign immunity; see note 87 infra); Gallegos v. Midvale
City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972).
'6 See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Evansville, 191 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1951); Crumbley v.
Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408, 135 So. 885, aff'd on rehearing,102 Fla. 408, 138 So. 486 (1931);
King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.
2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970).
77 As discussed previously (notes 20-22 supra) municipal corporations originally possessed no sovereign immunity. Therefore, cases upholding the constitutionality of notice
provisions of municipal corporations have found either a rational basis for classification, or
that the state has extended its own sovereign immunity to the munidpal corporation by
statute. For this latter reasoning see McCann v. Lake Wales, 144 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1962).
78 See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Evansville,
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few courts have formulated other relatively unimportant reasons
79
for finding the distinction between classes of litigants rational.
2. Recent Developments: Reich and Turner
Set against this background, the 1972 decision in Reich v. State
Highway Department80 was revolutionary. Reich was a consolidation
of three cases in which each of the plaintiffs challenged the
sixty-day notice provision of Michigan's State Tort Claims Act 8 l on
equal protection grounds. 82 The court, in a brief opinion, found
the notice provision unconstitutional.
In its discussion of equal protection, the majority opinion
reasoned that the obvious purpose of the Act was to waive state
immunity; 83 therefore, it was inconsistent with the purpose of this
statute to put governmental tort-feasors on anything but an equal
footing with nongovernmental tort-feasors. The court actually
found two arbitrary and unreasonable classifications: the distinction between governmental and private tort-feasors, and the distinction between their victims. There was one dissent in Reich,
84
which, in essense, relied upon the sovereign immunity rationale
as the basis for its opposition to the court's decision.
Reich's significance lies in the court's complete reliance upon a
perceived legislative waiver of sovereign immunity as the basis for
its finding that equal protection had been denied. The court stated
that "[c]ontrary to the legislature's intention to place victims of
negligent conduct on equal footing, the notice requirement . . .
bars the actions of the victims of governmental negligence after
191 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1951), and King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.
2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970),
are good examples of court reliance on these traditional kinds ofjustifications in establishing
a rational basis for classification.
,1 For instance, in Wilson & Co. v.Jacksonville, 170 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1948), the court
asserted simply that municipalities are entirely different from private parties, noting, for
example, that private parties are subject to property taxes, whereas municipalities generally
are exempt. See Gregory v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
80 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
81 This notice provision, although no longer wholly valid, is found in MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.996(104) (Supp. 1974).
82 Two theories of unconstitutionality were actually asserted. The first was the due
process claim that minority is a constitutionally protected justification for noncompliance.
The Michigan high court agreed, relying on its own precedent in Grubaugh v. City of St.
Johns, 384 Mich. 16, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970) (see note 55 and accompanying text supra), and
then proceeded to treat the more general and sweeping assertions of unconstitutionality on
equal protection grounds.
83 386 Mich. at 622, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
84 386 Mich. at 625, 194 N.W.2d at 703. See notes 75, 77 and accompanying text supra.
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only 60 days. The victims of private negligence are granted three
years ...,"" The Reich court did not give any consideration to the
numerous factors traditionally relied upon by courts in justification
of notice provisions.8 6 As a result of this failure, the decision can be
viewed as strictly limited: it relates only to the purposes and intent
of the Michigan legislature. Reich, therefore, does not provide an
equal protection argument that is broadly applicable to notice
provisions in other jurisdictions without any reference to the legis87
lative intent underlying the waiver, of immunity.
In addition to its limited scope, the Reich rationale has serious
analytical flaws. These flaws are shared and perhaps more clearly
illuminated by the 1973 decision in Turner v. Staggs.88 Indeed, the
facts and the law in Turner are substantially identical to those in
Reich. Here infant children brought suit against Clark County,
Nevada for the wrongful death of their mother. The mother had
died from a kidney disorder allegedly resulting from medical
malpractice at a county hospital. They failed to comply with the
state statute requiring notice of claim within six months to all
counties against which suit is brought. 8 9 The Nevada Supreme
Court noted that "minority alone will excuse compliance," but went
on to conclude that "the notice of claim requirements . . . deny
90
equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
The court based its decision upon the Reich rationale that since the
legislature had waived the immunity of governmental units, 91 it
85 386 Mich. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
86 See notes 76, 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
87 In Brantley v. Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.

983 (1974), a Texas court distinguished Reich for this very reason. The court held that the
Texas legislature had intended to permit such provisions by granting cities, through "home
rule" legislation, the authority to enact their own notice provisions. Reich was again distinguished for this reason by the Supreme Court of Washngton in Cook v. State, 83 Wash. 2d
599, 521 P.2d 725 (1974).
Reich has been extended, by subsequent decisions, to local governmental units in
Michigan. See Crook v. Patterson, 42 Mich. App. 241, 201 N.W.2d 676 (1972) (applying
Reich to county notice provision), and Friedman v. Farmington Township School Dist., 40
Mich. App. 197, 198 N.W.2d 785 (1972) (applying Reich to school district notice provision).
18 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1974).
89 The superseded county government provision requiring notice was codified at NEv.
REv. STAT. §§ 244.245, .250. The current provision, NEv. REv. STAT. § 244.245 (1973), no
longer places a time limitation on notice.
90 89 Nev. at 234, 510 P.2d at 882. The court could have decided this case solely on the
narrower constitutional grounds involved in the minority issue, directly overruling Barney v.
County of Clark, 80 Nev. 104, 389 P.2d 392 (1964). The court clearly went out of its way to
decide the more general constitutional question. 89 Nev. at 234 n.6, 510 P.2d at 882 n.6.
91 See NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.031 (1973).
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manifested an intent to put all tort-feasors on an equal footing.
Since the notice provision operated contrary to that intent, it
denied equal protection by setting up different classes of tortfeasors and tort victims.
Reich and Turner are open to criticism on two principal
grounds. First, the logic behind the "legislative intent" theory is not
sound. Quite clearly the Michigan and Nevada legislatures manifested a contrary intent by enacting the notice provisions in the
first place. A second and even more fundamental flaw was partially
uncovered by the dissent in Turner.92 The right to equal protection
under the laws is a fundamental constitutional, principle.9 3 And this
right to equal protection cannot be either created or destroyed by
state legislation. Yet following the Reich-Turner reasoning, the
Nevada and Michigan legislatures created the right to equality
among governmental and private tort-feasors and their victims by
abrogating sovereign immunity and intending to put these parties
on equal footing. Legislative intent, however, has nothing to do
with the question since equal protection is patently a matter of
constitutional dimension. This constitutional factor turns upon the
question of what legitimate state interest the classification
promotes, 94 not upon whether or not the legislature intended to
create the classification.
For these reasons Reich and Turner would perhaps have been
better decided if the Michigan and Nevada courts had met the
equal protection issue head-on. Their focus should have been on
whether their legislatures had a rational basis for establishing this
dual classification and allowing the discrimination which inevitably
95

results.

92 89 Nev. at 239, 510 P.2d at 885.

93 See notes 105-25 and accompanying text infra

94 It is recognized that this issue borders on the stormy area of the constitutionality of
sovereign immunity. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Note, Equal Protection
and State rmmunity from Tort Liability, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 716. It has been argued that the
constitutional question ought -to be resolved at the sovereign immunity level, and that if
sovereign immunity is constitutionally permissible then it is permissible for a state to
selectively lower its bar of immunity through devices such as notice provisions. This is the
implicit argument of the dissent in Reich. 386 Mich. at 625, 194 N.W.2d at 703. However,
such an argument overlooks the fundamental problem that notice provisions discriminate

between two sets of parties: (1) between private and governmental tort-feasors, and (2)
between parties injured by the government and those injured by private tort-feasors. From
this viewpoint, it is perfectly valid to inquire whether such classifications of tort-feasors and
tort victims violate equal protection, wholly independent of the sovereign immunity ques-

don. See notes 133-61 and accompanying text infra.
95 Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972). See notes 105-25 and
accompanying text infra.
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B. A Constitutional Frameworkfor Evaluating Notice of Claim Provisions: The Preferencefor Equal Protection
Although many cases have challenged the constitutionality of
notice provisions on both due process and equal protection
grounds, 96 Reich and Turner were decided solely on the basis of
equal protection. Neither the Michigan nor the Nevada court
articulated any reasons for this; nevertheless their choice of equal
protection appears sound. Due process is an inappropriate vehicle
of analysis for a number of reasons.

1. The Due Process Argument
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment offers
protection against any deprivations of life, liberty, and property
committed by the state or one of its agencies.9 7 Accordingly, an
absolute prerequisite to the triggering of a due process argument is
a finding of such a deprivation. 9 Although the Supreme Court has
given the phrase "life, liberty and property" a broad meaning, 99 it
is unlikely that any of the rights infringed by notice of claim
provisions would fit within this formulation. First, the Court has
recently retreated from a position which suggested that access to
the courts might be considered a due process right to a stance
which looks to the interest involved in the litigation, rather than to
the right of access itself.' 0 0 Second, the right of access in the
96 See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

98 As stated inBoard of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972),
"[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.... Mhe
range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite."
99 For example, it was frankly admitted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970),
that whether or not due process is violated "is influenced by the extent to which [the
aggrieved party] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss .... '
100In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court found that due process
required that indigents' court costs and filing fees be waived in divorce litigation. It was
hoped by some that this holding signalled the development of a basic right of access to the
courts. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1162. But two decisions subsequent to Boddie
-Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973)-have focused on the interests involved, rather than on the right to access. The Court
in Kras relied on the language of Justice Harlan in Boddie: "We do not decide that access for
all individuals to the courts is a right... gnaranteed by the Due Process Clause . ... " (401
U.S. at 382), and found discharge in bankruptcy to be a lesser interest than marriage and
divorce. 409 U.S. at 442. In like fashion the Court in Ortwein relied on Kras, finding the right
to appellate review of welfare agency determinations of "less constitutional significance than
the interest of the Boddie appellants." 410 U.S. at 659. Therefore, the inability of indigents to

litigate these interests was not violative of due process.
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present context is closely related to the sovereign immunity issue,
and the Court has refused to tangle with this matter on any
constitutional grounds. 1 1
Due process, particularly substantive due process, is also the
less appropriate mode of analysis because of its lack of clarity. It
has been criticized as being too subjective in nature, and therefore
too pliant a device in the hands of the judiciary.' 0 2 The
procedural-substantive dichotomy itself is clouded with uncertainty; indeed, substantive due process analysis is presently in a
state of disrepute. 0 3 Equal protection, however, is substantive by
nature,'0 4 and it has given rise to a well developed body of law
which speaks directly to the disparate treatment afforded litigants
under notice of claim requirements.
2. The Present Equal Protection Formula
In contrast to the methodology under the due process clause,
equal protection analysis focuses predominantly on the permissibility of a legislative classification rather than on whether a recognized property interest has been denied. 0 5 The concept of equal
protection presupposes that in order to function efficiently, states
and their governmental subdivisions must classify and treat their
citizens differently in various circumstances. 0 6 For this ob'o
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32 (1918). In
later cases, the Court has accepted immunity with almost blind tenacity. See, e.g., Honda v.
Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1967); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501-05 (1940).
1"I See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Note,
Boddie v. Connecticut and the ConstitutionalRights of Indigents, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 390, 397 (1972).
See also Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
103 See Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1057-60
(1968). Substantive due process is strongly criticized as taking policy-making out of the
hands of the legislature. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384-85 (1971) (Douglas,J.,
concurring); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, White, & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963).
104 Procedural due process has been described as dealing with the "how" of governmental action, while substantive due process deals with the "what." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 233 (1962). Equal protection deals more with the "what" than with the
"how" of legislative action. Equal protection generally addresses itself more to the fairness or
unfairness of the resulting classification than to the means by which the legislative purpose is
accomplished. See notes 105-15 and accompanying text infra.
105For example, in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), it was asserted, albeit
unsuccessfully, that even if the rigbt of appellate review of welfare agency determinations
was not protected by due process, the $25 filing fee was violative of equal protection because
it unconstitutionally classified and discriminated against the poor. Id. at 660-61. See Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), where the Court did
not find a denial of due process, but did find invidious classifications violative of equal
protection.
106 See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938). In Welch the Court recognized the
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vious reason not every legislative discrimination amounts to a denial of equal protection. The test for permissibility is a topic
07
which has received extensive judicial treatment over the years.1
In recent years, the Supreme Court has ostensibly employed
a controversial' 0 8 two-tiered test to review equal protection
challenges.' 0 9 In most situations the Court looks to the traditional
question of whether the classification bears a "rational relationship"
to the purpose of the legislation.'" But the Court has also articulated a second, co-existing formula: if the classification encompasses "suspect criteria," ' or if it affects a "fundamental right,"" 2
then only if there exists a "compelling state interest" for erecting
the classification will it withstand equal protection attack." 3 The
compelling state interest test, and with it the "close judicial
scrutiny" given to the classification under attack,' 1 4 is clearly a
more difficult standard for the states to meet 1 1 5
necessity for allowing the states to make discriminatory distinctions and stated that the equal
protection clause is applicable only where the state discrimination has been "hostile or
oppressive." See also Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 424 (1963).
107 It has been the subject of debate ever since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873), where the Supreme Court limited the operation of equal protection to
unfair treatment of blacks. Today, of course, the clause pertains to any legislative action. See
generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
108 See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18
(1972). Justice Marshall has probably been the most outspoken member of the Court in this
regard. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 558 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marsball, J., dissenting).
109 Many believe that the rigid two-tiered test is in the process of being abandoned, and
that the Court today is merely giving it lip-service. See Gunther, supra note 108, at 20-21;
notes 116-25, 131-32 and accompanying text infra.
110 See, eg., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509
(1937); Note, Developments in the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969);
Note, The EqualProtectionClauseand ExclusionaryZoning after Valtierraand Dandridge,81 YALE
L.J. 61 (1971).
"I See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953) (race); notes 120-22 and
accompanying text infra. See also Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. REv. 39.
12 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (voting); notes 117-19 and accompanying
text infra.
13 This test was well articulated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), a
decision premised in part on the fundamental right of interstate travel. According to the
Court, "in moving from State to State... appellees were exercising a constitutional right,
and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634
(emphasis in original). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
...See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); note 119 infra.
15 In a 1972 case involving an equal protection attack upon Tennessee voting laws
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The Burger Court has shown a decided disinclination to
subject state legislation to the close scrutiny of the compelling state
interest test.11 6 At most, only three interests have been clearly
deemed fundamental within the purview of this stricter formula:
interstate travel, 1 17 criminal appeals,' 1 8 and perhaps voting. 1 9
Furthermore, the suspect statutory classifications given close judicial scrutiny continue to be limited to the traditional ones of
race, 120 national origin,'121 and alienage.1 22 Recent decisions have

declined to apply the compelling interest test to classifications
23
involving wealth,'1 sex,

12 4

and illegitimacy.'

25

It would seem, therefore, that under the present formulation,
taking into account current judicial attitudes, the classifications
created by notice provisions would not be subjected to strict
scrutiny. The Supreme Court has defined a suspect class as "a
'discrete and insular' minority for whom . . . heightened judicial

solicitude is appropriate.' ' 2 6 Neither private tort-feasors nor victims of governmental tort-feasors are likely to be viewed as a
prescribing periods of residency as a prerequisite to eligibility, Chief Justice Burger complained that "[t]o challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to
condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
116 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Schlib v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971). See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
117 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
118 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
119 Although the Court in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969),
applied the strict scrutiny test to a voter qualifications statute, the Court in Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), distinguished Kramer and
dedined to apply strict scrutiny to a statute which regulated the right to vote. For a
discussion of this issue, see 59 CORNELL L. REv. 687 (1974).
120 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
121 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
122 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
123 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
124 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But even though the Court here refused to find
sex a suspect class it nevertheless invalidated as arbitrary and unreasonable an Idaho statute
which granted preferences to males over females in probate administration. See notes 131-32
and accompanying text infra.
125 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Here the Court did not find illegitimacy to be
a suspect class but did invalidate a statutory dassification scheme based on illegitimacy on the
grounds that it was arbitrary and unreasonable. See notes 131-32 and accompanying text
inf-ra.
126 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citations omitted). See San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) ("the traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection.").
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"discrete and insular" class. Nor do they have a long history of
discrimination based upon race, national origin, or alienage which
would qualify them for this status.
Focusing on the other half of the strict scrutiny formulation,
there is perhaps a better argument that the right to seek redress in
tort is itself deserving of a status as "fundamental.' 27 The Supreme Court has defined a fundamental right as one which "touches
a sensitive and important area of human rights.' 1 2 8 Although the
Court has hinted that access to the courts is of a fundamental
nature, 29 it has yet to hold so explicitly. 130 In light of the apparent
reluctance of the Court to expand the strict scrutiny test beyond
the limited range of currently recognized fundamental interests, it
would seem highly unlikely that access to the courts, particularly in
the notice of claim context, will be recognized as a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes at this time.
Despite its reluctance to apply strict scrutiny, the Court has
displayed a marked willingness to review state legislation in light of
the more permissive rational relationship test.' 3 1 Moreover, where,
as here, the interest might be said to border on suspect status, the
Court has been inclined to find an arbitrary and unreasonable
distinction. 3 2 Thus, the rational relationship test would appear to
be the most appropriate mode of constitutional analysis here.
127 See, e.g., Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 149, 285 N.E.2d 736, 746 (1972),

where the dissent argued that, in the context of sovereign immunity, the right of access to
the courts is a fundamental right.
128 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
129 In an early case, the Court indicated that access to the courts is central to the notion
of equal protection. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885). And in Chambers v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907), the Court gave another indication that it
considered this right to be fundamental. Id. at 148 (dictum). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), both Justices Douglas and Brennan in concurring opinions favored an
equal protection approach to this access problem. Id. at 383, 386. See also Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
130 In the context of due process the Court has expressly declined to find access a
fundamental right. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
131 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gunther, supra note 108, at 18-20. Gunther writes:
After the years in which the strict scrutiny-invalidation and minimal scrutinynonintervention correlations were virtually perfect, the pattern has suddenly become unsettled. After an era during which the "mere rationality" requirement
symbolized virtual judicial abdication, the Court ... has suddenly found repeated
occasions to intervene on the basis of the deferential standard.
Id. at 19.
132 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex classification); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155, 158 (1973).
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C. The Rationality of Notice Provisions
Of the two broad avenues which the courts have taken in
repelling constitutional attacks on notice of claim statutes-the
rational relationship approach' 3 3 and the sovereign immunity
approach' 34-only the former is assessable in terms of equal protection. The latter, by its very nature, is violative of equal protection since it makes the illogical assumption that notice provisions
are constitutional because a state may validly choose either to
maintain or to waive its sovereign immunity protection, and that in
the process any conditions, however, arbitrary, may be imposed. In
reality, sovereign immunity has nothing to do with the ultimate
classifications which notice provisions establish. Standing alone,
therefore, this principle cannot be said to clothe the resulting
distinctions with a semblance of rationality. 3 5 Rather, once
sovereign immunity has been waived, any legislative classifications
made pursuant thereto will be constitutional only if they conform
to the rational relationship test. Thus, the appropriate question for
consideration is: do the classifications erected through notice of
claim provisions have some rational relationship to the state's
legislative purposes, or do they rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective"? 36
It has been noted that the plentiful reasons espoused by courts
and others in support of notice provisions have generally been
classified into one or more of four categories13 7 which implicitly
rest upon two underlying notions of public welfare: protection of
governments from unnecessary expenditure, 38 and protection of
citizens from physical harm. 39 In light of these objectives, notice
133See notes 76, 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
134 See notes 75, 77 and accompanying text supra.
135 See note 94 supra.
136 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
137 See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
138 See Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408, 412, 138 So. 486, 489 (1931).
Most cases treating this issue fail to express the rationale underlying notice provisions. It is
tacitly understood that protection of public funds is behind the need for such things as quick
and timely investigation or settlement. See also King v. Johnson, 47 Ill. 2d 247, 251, 265
N.E.2d 874, 876 (1970) (distinguishing between local public entities and private parties
based upon monetary necessity of former for early notice); Wilson & Co. v. Jacksonville, 170
F.2d 877, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1948); notes 32-34, 36 and accompanying text supra.
139 The courts have rarely done more than identify the need for legislative classification
without exploring the underlying purpose. See Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 30,
492 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1972) ("[dleprivation of the city of an opportunity to make a prompt
investigation... and if any defect is found to exist to remedy it... are sufficiently obvious
not to require further elaboration.") See also notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
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of claim provisions are vulnerable to a finding of irrationality since
they typically fall far short of meeting their stated goals. 140
In searching for irrationality, it must be remembered that the
black-letter law mandates that "legislative solutions must be respected if the 'distinctions drawn have some basis in practical
experience.' 141 In practice, however, judicial outcomes clearly are
tempered by existing interests and circumstances. 42 For example,
the Supreme Court has recognized that interests guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights are more important than those in the social and
economic field, 143 and under the rational basis test a legislative
scheme will be subjected to closer scrutiny when the former interest is involved. 144 Postulating that access to the courts is a

relatively important interest, 145 it may be that the legislative purposes behind notice provisions should be examined under relatively close scrutiny. Under such scrutiny weak and tenuous legislative reasons would not be acceptable.
Obviously, there are significant general differences with respect to tort liability between local governmental units and private
parties which call for state regulation and classification. 14 6 In striv-

ing for a valid objective, however, a legislature cannot "use a
140 It is asserted that the notice provision scheme is an irrational one because not only is
the scheme an inefficient one ii-terms of the two public welfare goals asserted above (see
notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra), but also because it attempts to achieve these
goals at too great a price to private tort-feasors and victims of governmental tort-feasors.
Admittedly this argument is premised on the notion that the courts can and should factor
the interests involved into the rational basis test. In some cases notice provisions can only be
found wholly irrational if the effectiveness of the notice scheme is examined in conjunction
with the detriment to the interests involved.
141 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973), quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966).
142 The present two-tiered formula requires that the Court look at existing interests and
circumstances:
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in
essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual
interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (emphasis added). See Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
143 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 71 (1968).
144 The majority in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968), stated: "In applying the
Equal Protection Clause to social and economic legislation, we give great latitude to the
legislature in making classifications. .. . However that might be, we have been extremely
sensitive when it comes to basic civil rigbts." See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145 See notes 127-30 and accompanying text supra.
14C See Henke, supra note 28, at 100-01.
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cannon to kill a butterfly."'14 Where there is a less drastic means of
achieving the same result an otherwise valid piece of legislation
may be struck down. The Supreme Court has applied this principle
in a variety of contexts, 148 including equal protection. 149 In light of
this principle and the ready availability of less drastic means to
protect the governmental interests at stake, 150 it is clear that the
manifest injustices created by notice provisions 151 far outweigh the
benefits to be gained by these requirements.
Notice provisions contain an element of "overkill" for two
reasons. First, they only afford a governmental unit with notice in
those cases where an injured person intends to sue. If the purpose
of these provisions is truly to protect public funds and safety why
not deal with this goal directly and require notice in all cases where
a governmental body may have been responsible for an injury,
regardless of whether the injured party intends to sue? Second,
notice provisions are broad and indirect since they commonly
negate a right rather than impose a duty. Example can be taken
from the typical requirement in most states that motorists involved
in automobile accidents file an accident report with the proper
authority.1 52 Generally, the driver of an automobile which is in147In re Tyson, Inc. v. Tyler, 24 N.Y.2d 671, 674, 249 N.E.2d 453, 454, 301 N.Y.S.2d
602, 604 (1969).
148 In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 -(1960), the Court asserted that "even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved." See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
149 For example, in Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Court
found a Chicago ordinance which prohibited all picketing-except peaceful picketing of a
school involved in a labor dispute-within a certain distance of school buildings to be
violative of equal protection. The Court considered the ordinance to be too broad, stating
that "[s]uch excesses 'can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes'.., focusing on the abuses
and dealing even-handedly." Id. at 102, quoting Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948)
(emphasis added). Although the Court was applying the strict scrutiny test, Justice Marshall's
majority opinion makes it very clear that the holding is applicable to the gamut of equal
protection cases: "As in all equal protection cases... the crucial question is whether there is
an appropriate governrniental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment." 408
U.S. at 95; see Gunther, supra note 108, at 17-18. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972).
150 See notes 152-60 and accompanying text infra.
151See notes 6-7, 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
152 See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20008 (West 1971) (driver must report accident
within 24 hours in case of injury or death); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 V, § 11-406(a)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974) (driver must report accident within 10 days in case of injury
or property damage in excess of $100; failure to do so results in suspension of license); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAw §§ 605(a)-(c) (McKinney 1970) (driver must report accident within 10
days in case of injury, death, or property damage exceeding $200; failure to do so is
misdemeanor and can result in suspension or revocation of driver's license); OHiO REv.
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volved in an accident where there are injuries or property damage
in excess of a certain sum must report the accident within a
specified period of time. 153 Failure to do so will usually result in
suspension of the driver's license.' 54 The state's objective of being
quickly apprised of motor vehicle accidents is far better achieved
through this scheme than by one which deprives the noncomplying
driver of a potential cause of action. By analogy, a simple provision
requiring notice to be filed in all cases of substantial injury or
property damage, with a direct and proportional penalty for failure to comply, would more efficiently effect notice to public
entities.
The prevalence of liability insurance covering claims against
governmental units 155 further militates against finding notice provisions to be rationally related to legitimate objectives. The concern
of courts and legislatures to protect the public pocketbook from
tort claims 5 6 is not well-founded in light of the kind of insurance
coverage these governmental entities generally have or could easily
57
obtain. In some respects, such insurance does have drawbacks
CODE ANN. §§ 4509.06-.09 (Anderson 1973) (driver must report any accident within 30 days

or face possible suspension of license).
I53 See note 152 supra.
154 Id.
155 Most states now have statutes or constitutional provisions allowing their governmental entities to purchase liability insurance covering various aspects of their activities. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.191 (Supp. 1974) (State Board of Regents may provide general
liability insurance for its employees and all educational institutions under its control); GA.
CODE ANN. § 2-5902 (1973) (constitutional provision authorizing counties to purchase
liability insurance for motor vehicles under their control); IOWA CODE ANN. § 368A.1(12)
(Supp. 1974) (municipalities granted power to purchase liability insurance covering activities
of employees using motor vehicles of municipality); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-774(b) (Supp.
1974) (Boards of School Directors of all school districts may purchase insurance covering
negligent acts of school district's employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.07(2) (1957) (counties
given general power to obtain liability insurance). Furthermore, a survey in 1966 revealed
that 86% of cities with a population greater than 10,000 carried general public liability
insurance, and 96% of those cities carried motor vehicle public liability insurance. Municipal
Insurance Practices, 3 MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 224 (1966).
Not only are various activities insured (e.g., motor vehicle operation, acts of employees,
and "general" activities), but there are also numerous methods of insuring. These methods
include insurance through private carrier, state funding, and self insurance. For a discussion
of this topic, see B. VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY OF CITIES AND SCHOOLS FOR INJURIES
IN RECREATION AND PARKS

238-45 (1968).

156As discussed earlier, most courts are concerned more with the need of governmental
entities to make prompt investigations and obtain early resolutions of claims, i.e., protection
of public funds, than the need to quickly remedy defects, i.e., protection of the public safety.
See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
157 It has been asserted that the existence of insurance increases the likelihood of suits
and the amounts of jury verdicts. See B. VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 155, at 238; Gibbons,
LiabilityInsuranceand the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L.J. 588, 598.
Further, it has been argued .that it is a waste of public assets to have liability insurance for
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and certainly does not constitute the perfect anodyne for tort
liability in all cases.' 5 8 Furthermore, its applicability is limited in
many jurisdictions by its entanglement with notions of sovereign
immunity. 5 9 Nevertheless, commentators agree that the availability
of such insurance substantially lessens the tort liability concerns of
state governmental bodies.' 60 Certainly, to the extent that a governmental unit has adequate insurance coverage, notice provisions
serve virtually no purpose with regard to the protection of public
finances.
In summary, the equal protection argument asserted here is
two-edged. First, notice provisions, to a great extent, do not rationally serve any legitimate state goals. The sovereign immunity
rationale, utilized by many courts, is illogical, and by its very terms
satisfies no valid governmental objective. The public safety is not
adequately protected by notice provisions since they only effect
notice when a claim is brought. And protection of public funds is
not really served due to the ready availability, in most cases, of
liability insurance to governmental bodies. Second, to whatever
extent notice provisions do serve a legitimate state goal there is still
a strong argument that these provisions are irrational because of
the manner in which they achieve their objectives.16' More narrow
and direct methods, such as mandatory reporting of all accidents
certain exposures covered by other, privately acquired, insurance. See Van Alstyne, Injury,
Death and Taxes: The Decline of GovernmentalImmunity, 39 STATE GOVERNMENT 28, 34 (1966).
'58 J. ANDRUS, supra note 1, at 85. For instance, a local governmental unit may be too
small to bear the financial burden of fully insuring itself. See Borchard, State and Municipal
Liability in Tort-ProposedStatutory Form, 20 A.B.A.J. 747, 751-52 (1934). Of course a simple
solution to this particular problem might be state funding.
1-9 The issue of whether a governmental entity, by purchasing insurance, ipso facto
waives its immunity has been frequently debated. The cases are divided on this question.
Compare Thomas v. Broadlands Community School Dist., 348 111.App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636
(1952), and Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963), with
Boucher v. Fuhlbruck, 26 Conn. Sup. 79, 213 A.2d 455 (1965), and McGrath Building Co. v.
City of Bettendorf, 248 Iowa 1386, 85 N.W.2d 616 (1957). Some states have enacted statutes
expressly waiving immunity to the extent of insurance. See, e.g., N.D. CErr. CODE § 39-01-08
(1972); VT. STAT. ANN. § 29-1404 (1970). But see MICH. STAT. ANN.

§ 3.996(109) (1960)

(existence of insurance coverage not waiver of any defense). Also, some cases have held that
government entities cannot insure themselves because there is no liability against which to
insure. See, e.g., Ford v. Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P.2d 589 (1958).
160 See B. VAN DER SMIssEN, supra note 155, at 256-57; Henke, supra note 28, at 118-22;
Weyrauch, supra note 19, at 17-18. A number of courts and jurists have taken an even
stronger position than this, putting forward public liability insurance as the complete
solution to this concern. See Thomas v. Broadlands Community School Dist., 348 111. App.
567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 291-92,
118 N.W.2d 795, 802-03 (1962); Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 258-59, 111 N.W.2d 1,
24 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
161 See notes 141-51 and accompanying text supra.
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and comprehensive insurance coverage, would achieve these stated
aims without creating the invidious classifications that characterize
notice provisions.
CONCLUSION

The notice of claim provision is a ubiquitous institution among
state and local governments which inequitably, and arguably unconstitutionally, operates to shield those public entities from a large
measure of tort liability to which they would otherwise be exposed.
Due to its deep immersion in tradition and complicated entanglement with sovereign immunity, this important governmental advantage, utilized to the detriment of private citizens, has, until very
recently, remained impervious to general constitutional assault.
Although the courts have conceived ostensibly reasonable arguments in behalf of notice provisions, such arguments pale in light
of the injustices created by them and the sound alternatives available.
It is suggested that a constitutional challenge, grounded upon
equal protection, is convincingly meritorious. The high courts of
Michigan and Nevada have lent support to this proposition. 162 It is

hoped that as sovereign immunity and the underlying legal attitude toward governmental tort liability erode, this equal protection argument will find more substantial support in the courts and
legislatures.
Harold D. Gordon
162 See notes 80-91 and accompanying text supra.

